I. Concepts of Trust

Prof. Dr. Andreas Kaminski

The general question

A   B

- asks for a loan
- tells that p

A   B

The general question

makes a decision
on what basis?
(kind of reason)

A   B

The general question: Kinds or reason?

On what *kind* of reasons could B base her or his decision on?

Agenda

1. Epistemic Reasons: The Epistemic View of Trust(worthiness)

2. Normative Reasons: The Assurance View of Trust(worthiness)

3. Virtue Reasons: The Virtue View of Trust(worthiness)

1. Epistemic reasons:
The evidential view of trust(worthiness)

A

B

- asks for a loan
- tells that p

A

makes a decision
on what basis?

(kind of reason)

B

Loan

A   B

Loan

A   B

makes a decision
on the basis of
— Credit history
— socio-economic indicators
— dependency
          / |
Sanctions   Self-interst

Telling

A   B

Telling

A   makes a decision
on   the basis of

– claims history
– social-communicative indicators
– dependency

Sanctions   self-interst   B

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

The decision is considered as a problem of *knowledge:*

A   B

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

The decision is considered as a problem of *knowledge:*

* B tries to recognize whether A is trustworthy

A   B

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

The decision is considered as a problem of *knowledge:*

- B tries to recognize whether A is trustworthy

- Being trustworthy means in this case:

A   B

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

The decision is considered as a problem of *knowledge:*

- B tries to recognize whether A is trustworthy

- Being trustworthy means in this case:

The probability that A behaves as B wishes is

at least greater than that A behaves differently

evidence

prediction

A   B

The language of the evidential view:

1. **Evidence:** Epistemic reasons
2. **Expectation:** Prediction
3. **Trust:** Positive expectation
4. **Distrust:** Negative expectation
5. **Relationship:** Non-personal

evidence
prediction

A   B

1. **Evidence:** Epistemic reasons

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

1. **Evidence:** Epistemic reasons
    a. Track-Records

Telling

makes a decision
on the basis of
– claims history
– social-communicative indicators
– dependency

A   B

Sanctions   self-interst

The Washington Post
Democracy Dies in Darkness

Trump's false or misleading claims total 30,573 over 4 years

Four years of Trump falsehoods | Fact Checker

The Fact Checker

The Fact Checker counted a total of 30,573 false or misleading claims made by President Trump during his White House tenure. Here's what we learned. (Adriana Usero/The

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

1. **Evidence:** Epistemic reasons
   a. Track-Records

What impacts your FICO Scores: 35% payment history, 30% amounts owed, 15% length of credit history, 10% new credit, 10% credit mix

https://www.myfico.com/credit-education/whats-in-your-credit-score

Loan

makes a decision
on the basis of
— Credit history
— socio-economic indicators
— dependency

Sanctions   self-interst

A   B

1. **Evidence:** Epistemic reasons
   a.   Track-Records

FICO Score

Payment history (35%)

The first thing any lender wants to know is whether you've paid past credit accounts on time. This helps a lender figure out the amount of risk it will take on when extending credit. This is the most important factor in a FICO Score.

https://www.myfico.com/credit-education/whats-in-your-credit-score

Loan

makes a decision
on   the basis of
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Sanctions   self-interst

A   B

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

1. **Evidence:** Epistemic reasons
   a. Track-Records
   b. Indicators

HL R I S

1. **Evidence:** Epistemic reasons
   a. Track-Records
   b. Indicators

e.g. Microexpression

Telling

makes a decision
on the basis of
– claims history
– social-communicative indicators
– dependency

A   B

Sanctions   self-interst

Figure 5C Felt smile   Figure 6 False smile

(Ekman 1985: 198)

1. **Evidence:** Epistemic reasons
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   b. Indicators

Forensic criteria of witness evaluation

1. Glaubwürdigkeitskriterien, die sich aus dem Verlauf der Aussageentwicklung ergeben:
   a) Konstanz der Aussage über mehrere, zeitlich auseinanderliegende Befragungen,
   b) Art und Entstehungsweise späterer Ergänzungen.

2. Glaubwürdigkeitskriterien, die sich aus dem Aussageinhalt ergeben:
   a) Detaillierungsgrad und inhaltliche Besonderheiten — u. a. vom Zeugen wiedergegebene:
      Gespräche,
      Eigenseelische Vorgänge,
      Phänomenmäßiges und Nichtverstandenes,
      Vielgestaltige Verflechtungen mit äußeren Umständen,
      Komplikationen,
      Reaktionsketten,
      Inhaltliche Verschachtelungen,
      Ausgefallene Einzelheiten,
   b) Delikttypische Inhalte

3. Glaubwürdigkeitskriterien, die sich aus der Aussageweise ergeben:
   a) nacherlebende Gefühlsbeteiligung,

F. Arntzen, (1970): Psychologie der Zeugenaussage. System der Glaubhaftigkeitsmerkmale

1. **Evidence:** Epistemic reasons
   a. Track-Records
   b. Indicators

Some Sociodemographic Indicators

Address, Frequency of moves, Social milieu, Gender, Marital status, Age, Number of children, Household type, Education level, Professional qualification, Occupation Type of employment, Length of employment Employer, …

Kamp & Weichert (2006) Scoringsysteme zur Beurteilung der Kreditwürdigkeit, p. 51 ff.

Loan

A   B

makes a decision
on the basis of
– Credit history
– socio-economic indicators
– dependency

Sanctions   self-interst

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

1. **Evidence:** Epistemic reasons
   a. Track-Records
   b. Indicators
   c. Strategic considerations

Telling

makes a decision on the basis of
- claims history
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A   B

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Loan

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
1. **Evidence:** Epistemic reasons
   a. Track-Records
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Colemans decision model:

p = chance of receiving gain (the probability that the trustee is trustworthy)
L = potential loss (if trustee is untrustworthy)
G = potential gain (if trustee is trustworthy)

Decision: yes if $\frac{p}{1-p}$ is greater than $\frac{L}{G}$

indifferent if $\frac{p}{1-p}$ equals $\frac{L}{G}$

no if $\frac{p}{1-p}$ is less than $\frac{L}{G}$

Coleman (1990): Foundation of Social Theory, p. 99

Loan

A   B

makes a decision
on the basis of
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– socio-economic indicators
– dependency
Sanctions   self-interst

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

H L R S

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L = potential loss (if trustee is untrustworthy)
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A   B

Sanctions   Self-interst

.08.23   Andreas Kaminski   31

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L = potential loss (if trustee is untrustworthy)
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Loan

A   makes a decision
         on the basis of
         – Credit history
         – socio-economic indicators
         – dependency
                                      B
         Sanctions   self-interst

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

Characteristics of trust(worthiness) in the Evidential view:

- The more evidence, the better the reasons for the decision, the more trust or distrust

- Evidence: Information

- Strategy: search for information

- Trust or distrust equals a cognitive expectation (prediction)

- The object of trust can be a person as well as an object.

Terminological note: this concept of trust is often also referred to as *reliability*

Andreas Kaminski

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

Major problems of epistemic approaches of trust

1. Conceptual
2. Practical

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

1. **Major conceptual problems:** Trust Tends to Become Knowledge, or Control

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- The better the prediction that A will behave in the sense of B, the greater the trust of B in A

- Knowledge and especially control are great reasons to improve the prediction

overwhelming
evidence

Prediction
that A will behave
in the way B wants to

A   B

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

1. **Major conceptual problems:** Trust Tends to Become Knowledge, or Control

- The better the prediction that A will behave in the sense of B, the greater the trust of B in A

- Knowledge and especially control are great reasons to improve the prediction

Control: B threatens A with strong sanctions (e.g. violence). On this basis, B forms the prediction that A will behave as B wishes.

The greater the control, the better justified is B's trust in A

overwhelming evidence

Prediction that A will behave in the way B wants to

A   B

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

1. **Major conceptual problems: Trust Tends to Become Knowledge, or Control**

- The better the prediction that A will behave in the sense of B, the greater the trust of B in A

- Knowledge and especially control are great reasons to improve the prediction

Is this a situation in which B trusts A?

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Overwhelming evidence

Prediction that A will behave in the way B wants to

A   B

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

1. **Major conceptual problems:** Trust Tends to Become Knowledge, or Control

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Knowledge: B has A shadowed. B reads A's messages. B reads A's diary.

The better the knowledge, the greater the trust.

Overwhelming evidence

Prediction that A will behave in the way B wants to

A   B

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

1. **Major conceptual problems:** Trust Tends to Become Knowledge, or Control

- The better the prediction that A will behave in the sense of B, the greater the trust of B in A

- Knowledge and especially control are great reasons to improve the prediction

It seems more appropriate to say that B does not need to trust A

Knowledge: B has A shadowed. B reads A's messages. B reads A's diary.

The better the knowledge, the greater the trust.

and does not trust A

overwhelming evidence

Prediction that A will behave in the way B wants to

A   B

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

1. **Major conceptual problems:** The Disappointment of trust becomes a mere „surprise"

- What happens if B's expectation is disappointed because A does not behave as predicted?

prediction is disappointed

A   B

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

1. **Major conceptual problems: The Disappointment of trust becomes a mere „surprise"**

- What happens if B's expectation is disappointed because A does not behave as predicted?

- Predicition represents a cognitive expectation.

prediction is disappointed

A   B

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- It is similar to the expectation that water will begin to boil, for example, at 70 degrees Celsius under normal conditions.

prediction is disappointed

A   B

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

1. **Major conceptual problems: The Disappointment of trust becomes a mere „surprise"**

- What happens if B's expectation is disappointed because A does not behave as predicted?

- Prediction represents a cognitive expectation.

- It is similar to the expectation that water will begin to boil, for example, at 70 degrees Celsius under normal conditions.

- If this expectation is disappointed, then the expectation is rationally abandoned. One learns. This characterizes cognitive expectations.

prediction
is disappointed

A   B

part
of a bet   learning

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

Major problems of epistemic approaches of trust

1. Conceptual
   a. Trust becomes indistinguishable from knowledge and control
   b. The Disappointment of trust becomes a mere „surprise"

2. Practical

2. **Major practical problems:** **Does the evidential approach work?**

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

2. Major practical problems: Does the evidential approach work?

- The idea is that the question of trust is reduceable to a knowledge problem

- Evidence based on *my* experience, possibilites and inferences

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

2. Major practical problems: Does the evidential approach work?

- The idea is that the question of trust is reduceable a knowledge problem
- Evidence based on *my* experience, possibilites and inferences

1. Track record model

$$\frac{\text{Number of true statements}}{\text{Number of statements}}$$

= Probability of being trustworthy

2. Indicator Observable X

e.g., voice, interest, gestures

$$\frac{\text{Number of people observed X}}{\text{Number of true statements}}$$

= Probability of being trustworthy

Both variants are reductively empirical: a problem of knowledge

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

2. Major practical problems: Does the evidential approach work?

Coady's criticism: reduction to own experience not feasible

1. Track record model

how do I know that they are true?

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e.g., voice, interest, gestures

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Coady (1990): Testimony, p. 79-84.

HL RIS

2. Major practical problems: Does the evidential approach work?

Coady's critique of Hume:

~why?~

1. Reduction does not succeed

Reduction means reduction to my *own* experience

Then I only know in a few cases, based on my own experience, which statements are true

That is why I am interested in the knowledge of others in the first place

Or I assess the truth of the statements of others by the experience <u>of others</u>, what is true

Then I am depending on others – not my own experience

2. **Major practical problems:** Does the evidential approach work?

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

2. **Major practical problems: Does the evidential approach work?**

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

2. **Major practical problems:** **Does the evidential approach work?**

Lahno's (2002) critique of the epistemic response:

What I accept as <u>evidence</u> already <u>depends on my trust</u> or mistrust in the source that presents the evidence to me!

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2. **Major practical problems:** Does the evidential approach work?

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> What I accept as <u>evidence</u> already <u>depends on my trust</u> or mistrust in the source that presents the evidence to me!

Donald J. Trump @realDonaldTrump

Let's take a closer look at that birth certificate. @BarackObama was described in 2003 as being "born in Kenya."

Tweet übersetzen

Shocker! Obama still 'Kenyan-born' in 2007 - WND
While some quickly dismissed as an anomaly yesterday's explosive revelation that Barack Obama's former literary agency billed him as "born in Kenya" back in 199...
wnd.com

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1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

1. Major conceptual problem:
The empirical approach is based on impossible assumptions

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The empirical approach is based on impossible assumptions

Coady's line of argument

From the evidential point of view:

(1) Only experience determines the extent to which we can trust others.

(2) This must therefore allow *in principle* there is to no correspondence between the statements of others and reality.

(3) But then there can be no statements, because there would not even be a language that we could learn.

A language presupposes that there is a reliable match (a harmony of our judgements)!

1. Major conceptual problem:
The empirical approach is based on impossible assumptions

Coady's criticism: reduction to own experience not feasible

1. Track record model

$$\frac{\text{Number of true statements}}{\text{Number of statements}}$$

= Probability of being trustworthy

2. Indicator Observable X

e.g., voice, interest, gestures

$$\frac{\text{Number of people observed X}}{\text{Number of true statements}}$$

= Probability of being trustworthy

1. Epistemic Reasons: The evidential view

1. Major conceptual problem:
The empirical approach is based on impossible assumptions

transcendental-pragmatic argument

Conclusion

If there is a language, we are by and large

a priori justified

in trusting others.

Agenda

1. Epistemic Reasons: The Epistemic View of Trust(worthiness) ✔

2. Normative Reasons: The Assurance View of Trust(worthiness)

3. Virtue Reasons: The Virtue View of Trust(worthiness)

2. Normative Reasons
The assurance view of trust(worthiness)

H L R I S

- asks for a loan
- tells that p

A   B

H L R I S

A   B

makes a decision
on what basis?
(kind of reason)

2. Normative Reasons: The assurance view

makes a decision
on what basis?
(kind of reason)

A   B

gives

takes
responsibility

an
assurance

A

B

makes a decision
on what basis?
(kind of reason)

gives
an
assurance

takes
responsibility

Why believes B p?
Because A told her/him

2. Normative Reasons: The assurance view

The normative answer: A takes responsibility for what is asserted

Richard Moran's New Paradigm:

The difference between "trusting in something" and "trusting *you*"

2. Normative Reasons: The assurance view

Moran's critique of the evidential view:

In the Evidential view, I do *not* trust the *other person*.

I trust either *my own*
cognitive faculty (Hume)

indicators

Or I trust the generalized other
(Coady)

But my trust does not refer to *you!*

We have apriori evidence

Our relationship does not count

- Observing
- Searching for evidence
- Inductive reasoning

2. Normative Reasons: The assurance view

Moran's insight:

Trustor ⌒ Trustee

> to a form of evidence. And yet it is the special relations of telling someone, being told, and accepting or refusing another's word that are the home of the network of beliefs we acquire through human testimony. And these relations, I hope to show, provide a kind of reason for belief that is categorically different from that provided by evidence.

[Moran 2005: 4]

Andreas Kaminski

2. Normative Reasons: The assurance view

Moran's insight:

Trustor   Trustee

- The relationship between S and H is crucial
- Here something is added, a security that does not and cannot exist in the evidential view:
- A offers B an assurance
- On his/her own free will (not passively observed)
- A is responsible for B's belief

The conceptual problem with Moran's proposal: A Trust trilemma

If trust *is* a reason, then I *have* no reason to trust.

The conceptual problem with Moran's proposal: A Trust trilemma

If trust *is* a reason, then I *have* no reason to trust.

This may seem acceptable at first, but it neglects the relationship!

Because I cannot explain

(1) why I trust this person but not that one

(2) how I make the distinction between trustworthy and untrustworthy people

(3) Worse, I can't even tell why I trust my best friend

CNN politics The Biden Presidency Facts First US Elections

Edition

Woman who lost father to Covid-19: 'His only preexisting condition was trusting Donald Trump'

By Paul LeBlanc, CNN
Updated 1334 GMT (2134 HKT) August 18, 2020

NEWS & BUZZ

Trump Organization after golf course cc canceled...

Analysis: Ron John: the hard way this w

Trusting Trump cost my father's life: Woman who lost father to coronavirus speaks out 02:19

Conceptual issues:

- Trust becomes an practice based on pure chance (without reason)
- Trust seems to be indistinguishable from naivity

Practical issues:

- We cannot understand how we distinguish between trustworthy and non-trustworthy people anymore (no base for this distinction)

Agenda

1. Epistemic Reasons: The Epistemic View of Trust(worthiness) ✔

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3. Virtue Reasons
The virtue view of trust(worthiness)

3. Normative Reasons: The assurance view

Three fundamental problem areas

1. Reason and trust

Evidential view

Assurace view

The more epistemic reasons I have, the less I need and can trust

I can not reasonably distinguish whom I trust and whom I don't trust.

This is an absurd consequence because: the epistemic reasons are reasons for trustworthiness.

I can not even explain why a good friend is trustworthy – which may even hurt him!

That means: if someone is utmost trustworthy, I can not trust him.

Three fundamental problem areas

2. Disappointment and trust

<div style="color:green">Evidential view</div>

The moral response of disappointed trust can not be understood:

Not the other one disappointed me.

But I was wrong (=cognitively)

<div style="color:orange">Assurace view</div>

There is no possibility to learn when it is appropriate to trust and when it is not.

I always trust blindly

Without reasons

Three fundamental problem areas

3. Trust vs. Risk calculation vs. Naivety

<div style="color:green">Evidential view</div>

Trust cannot be distinguished from risk calculations

<div style="color:orange">Assurace view</div>

Trust cannot be distinguished from naivety

When can B attribute virtue to A?

A   B

1. B must *recognise* something in A's behaviour that justifies attributing virtue to A

2. However, A must *recognise* the behaviour as virtuous for this purpose

3. For this, B in turn must recognise the behaviour as virtuous

4. To this end, both must *recognise* each other as trustworthy and trusting.

When can B attribute virtue to A?

A   B

Then it is not reasonable

1. ~~B must *recognise* something in A's behaviour that justifies attributing virtue to A~~

2. However, A must *recognise* the behaviour as virtuous for this purpose

3. For this, B in turn must recognise the behaviour as virtuous

4. To this end, both must *recognise* each other as trustworthy and trusting.

H L R S

When can B attribute virtue to A?

A   B

Then it just appears similar to a virtue

1. B must *recognise* something in A's behaviour that justifies attributing virtue to A

2. ~~However, A must *recognise* the behaviour as virtuous for this purpose~~

3. For this, B in turn must recognise the behaviour as virtuous

4. To this end, both must *recognise* each other as trustworthy and trusting.

H L R I S

When can B attribute virtue to A?

A   B

if not then

B may just predict A (common)

1. B must *recognise* something in A's behaviour that justifies attributing virtue to A

2. However, A must *recognise* the behaviour as virtuous for this purpose

3. ~~For this, B in turn must recognise the behaviour as virtuous~~

4. To this end, both must *recognise* each other as trustworthy and trusting.

When can B attribute virtue to A?

A   B

1. B must *recognise* something in A's behaviour that justifies attributing virtue to A

2. However, A must *recognise* the behaviour as virtuous for this purpose

3. For this, B in turn must recognise the behaviour as virtuous

4. ~~To this end, both must *recognise* each other as trustworthy and trusting.~~

The advantage of the virtue-based approach:

The conceptual problems are resolved:

- It combines an epistemic and normative perspective

- It does not turn our trust into predictive games or naivity

- It explains how we can learn to trust and be normatively hurt

But some practical issues remain:

- It is difficult to assess the virtues of other, especially in highly differentiated societies (scientists, physicians, lawyers, etc.)

- Trusts need to be elaborated and developed socially (community)

Agenda

1. Epistemic Reasons: The Epistemic View of Trust(worthiness) ✓

2. Normative Reasons: The Assurance View of Trust(worthiness) ✓

3. Virtue Reasons: The Virtue View of Trust(worthiness) ✓

Some my publications on trust

- Kaminski, Andreas. „Die Form vom Vertrauen und ihre verwickelte Praxis". In *Vertrauen und Transparenz - für ein neues Europa*, herausgegeben von Alfred Hirsch, Petar Bojanić, und Željko Radinković, 163–83. Conferentia. Belgrad: Inst. für Philisophie und Gesellschaftstheorie, 2013.

- Kaminski, Andreas. „Hat Vertrauen Gründe oder ist Vertrauen ein Grund? Eine (dialektische) Tugendtheorie von Vertrauen und Vertrauenswürdigkeit". In *Praxis und „zweite Natur" - Begründungsfiguren normativer Wirklichkeit in der Diskussion*, herausgegeben von Jens Kertscher und Jan Müller, 121–39. Münster: Mentis, 2017.

- Kaminski, Andreas. „Begriffe in Modellen: Die Modellierung von Vertrauen in Computersimulation und maschinellem Lernen im Spiegel der Theoriegeschichte von Vertrauen". In *Simulieren und Entscheiden: Entscheidungsmodellierung, Modellierungsentscheidungen, Entscheidungsunterstützung*, herausgegeben von Nicole J. Saam, Michael Resch, und Andreas Kaminski, 1. Auflage 2019., 167–92. Sozialwissenschaftliche Simulationen und die Soziologie der Simulation. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH; Springer VS, 2019.

- Kaminski, Andreas. „Dialektik als Weise des Philosophierens. Erkennen und Anerkennen, exemplifiziert am Phänomen des Vertrauens". In *Möglichkeiten der Reflexion*, herausgegeben von Jan Müller, Michael Nerurkar, und Philipp Richter, 55–66. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018.

- Kaminski, Andreas. *Die verwickelte Einfachheit von Vertrauen: und seine spekulative Struktur*. Marburg: [accepted Habilitationsschrift, book publication will be fortcoming 2024], 2020.

- Lampe, Hildrun, und Andreas Kaminski. „Verlässlichkeit und Vertrauenswürdigkeit von Computersimulationen". In *Mensch-Maschine-Interaktion: Handbuch zu Geschichte – Kultur – Ethik*, herausgegeben von Kevin Liggieri und Oliver Müller, 1. Auflage 2019. Stuttgart, 2019.